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ABSTRACT 
This thesis deals with the creation of a set of 
FORTRAN programs for use with the DF.Csystem-20 computer 
for Implementing the public-key cryptosvstem invented by 
R. Rlvest, A. Shamir, and L. Adieman (RSA) of M.i.T. 
In addition a FORTRAN program was written to subject the 
cryptosystem to a cryptanalytic attack proposed by T. 
Herlestam. 
A brief summary of the field of crvptology is 
provided. Use of conventional crvptology in providing 
privacy and security in computer and communications 
systems is reviewed. Recent research Indicates that the 
best commercially available cryptographic svstem, the 
National Bureau of Standards Data Rncryptlon Standard, may 
not provide adeguate protection for many more years due to 
the   possibility  of  building  an  inexpensive  machine 
utilizing microprocessors capable of oerforming the 
cryptanalysis using exhaustive search. Discussed is the 
implications to key distribution protocols which recommend 
that a key be split into several pieces which are then 
distributed over several channels. Tt is concluded that 
if the chance of any portion of a DES key being 
compromised is significant then this is not a safe 
protocol considering the reduced keyspace over which an 
antagonist must perform a search. 
Public-key cryptosystems are not olaaued by the 
necessity of first distributing the cryptographic keys 
over a secure channel. This plus the fact that they 
provide a method of implementing signatures and receipts 
makes such a system ideal for use with an electronic mail 
system. The RSA public-key cryDtosystem was found to be 
much slower than the DES. The RSA system reguires the use 
of multiprecision integer arithmatic. The multiprecision 
routines used are presented. Key generation reguires the 
ability to find prime numbers at least 40-digits long for 
adeguate security. A program was written that can find 
prime numbers of this magnitude in less than half a minute 
of CPU time with high reliability. The process for 
encrypting a plaintext message M into a ciphertext C is: 
CSMe(mod n) 
X 
the decryption function is: 
M=Cd(mod n) 
where n is the product of two laroe primes; e and d 
chosen by special criteria. Based on experimental results 
it was found that e and d should have a high proportion of 
zeroes in their binary representations for rapid 
encryption/decryption. EncryDtion/decrvPtion time was 
found to increase linearly with the size of n and 
linearly, but discontinuously with the size of e and d. 
The system developed is not useful for a high traffic 
volume system. It could be used to Inexpensively secure 
an insecure channel for the distribution of the keys of a 
conventional cryptosystem. A suacrestion is made for using 
a public-key cryptosystem to provide signature capabiliy 
while security and privacy are orovided using a 
conventional cryptosystem. 
The experiments using Herlestam's cryptanaiytic 
attack were not successful at breaking the RSA 
cryptosystem. Only in trivial cases where very 
unrealistically small n were used was there the slightest 
success. It is concluded that for large n a cryotanalvtlc 
attack based upon factoring n would be less costly, and 
more likely to succeed. 
CHAPTER 1 
AM OVERVIEW OF CRYPTOLOGY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cryptoloay, despite its ever increasing usefulness as 
a method of insuring the security of information 
communicated over many kinds of systems, e.g., military, 
diplomatic, and business, remains an arcane branch of 
human knowledge. The following overview of cryDtology is 
presented so that the reader, who is unfamiliar with this 
field, may better follow the discussion in later chapters. 
Cryptology encompasses two main branches. These are, 
in the respective order in which thev loaically would have 
developed, CRYPTOGRAPHY and CRYPTANALYSIS . Cryptography 
(from the Greek kryptos, "secret", and graphein, "to 
write") may be defined as the science or art of conveying 
a  message,  known  as  PLAINTEXT,  in  a form, known as a 
CRYPTOGRAM,  which  Is  unintelligible   to  anyone not 
possessing  knowledge  of  how  the  transformation of the 
message   was   accomplished.    The   practitioner of 
cryptography is called a CRYPTOGRAPHER. 
Cryptanalysis may be defined as the science or art of 
extracting the meaning from a crvotogram without the 
knowledge of how the cryptogram was constructed, and/or 
discerning the actual technigue (algorithm and key) used 
to convert a given plaintext into its corresponding 
cryptogram.  The practitioner is called a CRYPTAMALYST. 
Cryptology is an old field that has probably been 
practiced in one form or another since man first began 
communicating his thoughts in writing. References to 
cryptographic procedures, and examples of cryptography 
have been found in the Bible (in Jeremiah XXV.-26, LI.-41, 
and in Isaiah VII.-6 the cryptographic name of the city of 
Babel is Sheshach) see Milliken C1J, in Plutarch, and in 
the fifth century B.C. records of the Persian court.[21. 
For a fascinating and thorough history of cryptology and 
cryptanalysis the reader Is directed to a book by David 
Kahn (33. 
The main task of cryptography is to transform a 
plaintext message into a cryptogram, also known as a 
CIPHERTEXT when the cryptographic transformation used is a 
cipher, by a cryptographically secure method. That is, 
the method must withstand intense efforts at 
cryDtanalysis. The more secure, the higher the WORK 
FACTOR' is for the cryptanalyst. Plaintext may be 
converted to a cryptogram by either of two major classes 
of CRYPTOSYSTEM. A message may be ENCIPHERED (ENCRYPTED) 
using a CIPHERSYSTEM, or it may be ENCODED using a CODE 
SYSTEM. 
1.2 CODE SYSTEMS 
In a code system the components of the plaintext, 
e.a., words, phrases, numbers are related to their 
eguivalent code group by means of a code book or 
dictionary. No fixed relationship is maintained between 
the number of symbols in the Dlaintext and in the encoded 
version known as CODETEXT. 
Table l.l contains a portion of a code system based 
on an example given in [41. Note the use of two common 
methods of frustrating the efforts of the cryptanalyst. 
One  is the ,use of more than one codetext eguivalent for a 
ENCODING 
PLAINTEXT 
• 
NULLS 
• 
CODETEXT 
• 
• 
CRYPTANALYSIS 
CRYPTANALYST 
CRYPTOGRAM 
CRYPTOGRAPHER 
CRYPTOLOGY 
• 
• 
41*9 
802 
014 
882 
• 
01*3 
712 
984 
444 
002 
CODETEXT 
• 
• 
01*2 
013 
014 
015 
016 
DECODING■ 
PLAINTEXT 
BOMBER 
CRYPTANALYSIS 
(NULL) 
JAMMING 
(NULL) 
Table 1.1 
A simple example of a 2 part code. 
component of plaintext. These are known as HOMOPHONES. 
The second device is the use of codetext with no plaintext 
equivalent.  These are known as NULLS. 
Code systems have been used for reasons other than to 
provide security. The MORSE code was developed primarily 
to overcome the technical limitations of wire 
communications in the nineteenth century. The very 
earliest of commercial codes was develooed by Lloyd's, the 
Insurance company, in the late elohteenth century. It 
consisted of using a set of light siqnals for ship to ship 
communication [5]. Such telegraphic codes were not new, 
only their use for commercial applications. The 
versatility and value of code systems are limited because 
only plaintext messaaes for which there exist a codetext 
equivalent may be encoded. 
1.3 CIPHER SYSTEMS 
Cipher systems are superior to code systems for  most 
> 
applications.   Cipher  systems  have two main components: 
an .algorithm, and a KEY.  The algorithm  should  define  a 
very large set of mathematical procedures) for transforming 
plaintext into ciphertext.   The  key  f*  what  specifies 
which  of  the  numerous possible transformations is to be 
used.  In general a cryptographic key  is  a  sequence of 
numbers   or   characters  which  is  known  only by the 
legitimate users of the cryptosystem. Idealy the key 
should be short for easy memorization or storaqe. 
The alaorithm may also oe keot secret, but if this is 
a  requirement,  it  is  a  siqn of severe weakness in the 
* 
cryptosystem. To be useful the algorithm should permit 
rapid transformation of plaintext to ciphertext. ' For each 
encrypting operation there must exist an inverse 
transformation, preferably rapid, that changes the 
ciphertext back to plaintext. This operation is known as 
DECIPHERMENT or DECRYPTMENT. 
Equation 1.1 is a symbolic mathematical 
representation of a cryptosystem as a single parameter 
family of invertible transformations from a space of 
F.{M}-XC> (1.1) k 
plaintext messages {M> to a space of ciphertext messages 
<C}. The parameter is k, the key, and is selected from 
the set <K} called the keyspace. 
In general there are three main classes of ciphers: 
SUBSTITUTION CIPHERS, TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS, and a 
combination of these known as a PRODUCT CIPHER. These 
three classes cover all conventional cipher systems. 
During the 1970s a completely new class of cipher was 
discovered. This was the PUBLIC-KEY CIPHER and win be 
treated' in a seperate chapter. 
In a substitution cipher different characters are 
substituted for the plaintext characters. The characters 
used need not come from a different set from that which is 
used to construct the plaintext. As an example of a 
substitution cipher we could use a SHIFT or as it is 
sometimes called, Caesar cipher (after Julius Caesar who 
is said to have used it). In such a cipher system the 
alphabet is offset to Itself; the kev being the amount of 
offset. Julius Caesar is said to have used a shift of 
three. Thus, emulating Julius Caesar, we get the 
substitution cipher system shown in Table 1.2. 
PLAINTEXT : ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPORSTUVWXYZ 
CIPHERTEXT: DEFGHIJKLMNOPORSTUVWXYZABC 
Table 1.2 
An example of a shift cioher. 
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Using such a cipher, the plaintext, GARY  FISHER,  becomes 
KDVB IMXLHV. 
Such a cipher is very insecure and can easily be 
broken using a table of letter frequencies. Greater, but 
not much greater, security can be obtained by more 
randomly associating the letters of the plaintext alphabet 
with the letters of the ciphertext alDhabet. One method 
of achieving this is to use what is known as a KEYWORD or 
KEYPHRASE. This is illustrated in Table 1.3 using KEYWORD 
as the keyword.  A code is not a substitution cipher at a 
PLAINTEXT : ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPORSTUVWXYZ 
CIPHERTEXT: KEYWORDABCFGHIJLMNPOSTUVXZ 
Table 1.3 
An example of a shift cipher usina a keyword, 
grosser level of language, i.e., words or phrases rather 
than individual letters of the alphabet, because, unlike a 
code, a substitution cipher maintains a fixed relationship 
between the number of symbols in the Plaintext and the 
ciphertext. 
11 
In  transposition  cipher   systems   the   orlqinal 
characters  are  retained but their order of appearance is 
jumbled.  One simple cipher of this type is to  write  the 
plaintext  in  blocks  of some specified lenqth (the key), 
and encrypt the plaintext by then rewritinq the messaqe in 
column  order.   For  example,  the Plaintext GARY FISHER, 
using a' key of two would be enciphered by first writing it 
as: 
GA 
RY 
FI 
SH 
ER 
and then rewriting it as GRFSHAYIHR. 
Product ciphers were greatly  advanced  during  World 
War  II  when  very  secure  ciphers  were developed using 
alternate   steps   or   ROUNDS  of   transposition   and 
substituion.   Today  product ciphers constitute the major 
area of research in conventional cryotography. 
There is one other major method of classifying 
ciDhers. Any cipher is either a STREAM CIPHER or a BLOCK 
CIPHER. Stream ciphers process the Plaintext in small 
pieces, usually characters or, in the case of digital 
equipment, bits. The "one time Dad" to be discussed 
shortly is a stream cipher. Block ciphers operate on 
blocks of text several  characters  long.   A  good  block 
12 
cipher will encipher two very similar but different texts 
into two very different clphertexts. In other words, the 
cryptosystem Droduces a strong intersymbol dependence 
between each symbol in a block of Dlaintext. Advanced 
block ciphers extend this intersymbol dependence between 
blocks. This is a technique known as BLOCK CHAINING. 
Block chaining is very useful for highly redundant and/or 
structured data. 
The security of a cryptosystem is rarely provable by 
strict mathematical argument. During the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries many mathematical proofs were 
developed as new cryptosystems came along. Unfortunately 
such proved secure systems were constantly being broken. 
Mathematical Droofs fell into disfavor; the only acceDted 
proof of a cryptosystem's security being evidence of it 
having resisted intense cryptanalvtic attack over many 
years [61. Unfortunately few ciphers suitable for data 
encryption, and electronic mail systems are available 
which have been subjected to years of cryptanalvtic 
attack. 
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1.4 CRYPTANALYSIS 
A system is considered COMPUTATIONALLY SECURE if the 
cost of cryptanalysis is qreat enouqh to prevent an 
adversary from carrying out the computation necessary to 
break the cioher, i.e., there is a high work factor. If a 
system can withstand any amount of computation it is 
considered UNCONDITIONALLY. SECURE. 
Only one cipher system, the Vernam cipher or Mone 
time pad", is known to be proved secure. Shannon 
accomplished this in a pioneering paner on information 
theory [7], The Vernam cioher was patented in 1918, vet 
today it is the cryptosystem used on the Washington to 
Moscow hot line because no better system has been 
developed. The following example in modulo 26 arithmatic 
(any base may be used) win serve to illustrate the 
operation of the Vernam cipher. Once again using GARY 
FISHER as the plaintext. The first step is to assign a 
unigue numerical value to each letter of the alphabet.  If 
A=0,  B=l, C=2, ,Z=25 then the Plaintext, GARY FISHER, 
becomes 6,0,12,24,5,8,13,7,4,12 ignoring blanks. Next a 
random key is generated consisting of numbers between 0 
and 26 inclusive. As an example, assume the following ten 
numbers  are  produced  from  a  random  number generator: 
14 
5,17,22,1*23,6,16,5,14,24. In order to encipher the 
plaintext, take • the numerical form of each of the 
plaintext letters and add to them the corresponding random 
number from the key. This sum is then divided by 26 and 
the remainder is the ciphertext. For deciphering the 
ciphertext number has Its corresponding key number 
subtracted from it. The result is then divided by 26 and 
the remainder is the numerical value of the plaintext 
character. This entire operation is illustrated in Table 
1.4. The security of this cipher resides in the complete 
randomness of the key which causes a complete lack of 
structure in the ciphertext. It should be apparent that 
pseudorandom number generators may safely be used to 
generate keys only if they oass the statistical tests for 
randomness, e.g., pokei? test, runs test, etc. with flying 
colors, in order to frustrate the cryptanalyst, and are 
known only by the legitimate users of the system. A 
pseudorandom number generator and its seed are identical 
to the key and must be afforded equal protection. A major 
problem with the Vernam cipher is that the key must be as 
long as the message. 
In general there are three modes of cryDtanalvtic 
attack. A CIPHERTEXT ONLY attack is one in which the 
cryptanalyst  only  has  access  to   actual   pieces   of 
15 
PLAINTEXT: GARYFISHER 
NUMERICAL FORM:     6     012  24     5     8  13     7     412 
ENCIPHER 
KEY: 
plus 
PLAINTEXT: 
modulo 26= 
ClPHERTEXT: 
5 17 22  1 23 6 16 5 14 24 
6 012 24  5 813 7 412 
11 17 8 25  2 14  3 12 18 10 
DECIPHER 
ClPHERTEXT: 
minus 
KEY: 
modulo 26= 
PLAINTEXT: 
11 17 8 25  2 14  3 12 18 10 
5 17 22  1 23 6 16 5 14 24 
6 012 24  5 813  7 412 
Table 1.4 
An example of the Vernam cipher or "one time pad" 
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ciphertext. This represents the most difficult form of 
cryptanalysis since only throuah study of ciphertext must 
the key arid, possibly the algorithm, be deduced. A KNOWN 
PLAINTEXT attack is one in which the cryptanalyst has 
access to pieces of ciphertext and the corresponding 
plaintext. A CHOSEN PLAINTEXT attack is one in which the 
cryDtan'alyst can submit plaintext of his own choosinq to 
the cryptosystem and can then studv the resultinq 
ciphertext. 
Of the three modes of attack the first is by far the 
most likely to occur. Substitution clDhers easily succumb 
to attacks of this kind. A larcre bodv of data has been 
collected over the years about such things as the 
frequency of occurance of each letter of the alphabet, 
each digraph, each trigraph, words of one letter, words of 
two letters, etc. in English and manv other languaoes. 
See Miliikin [13 for tables of such data. 
If a cryptosystem is considered insecure against a 
known Plaintext attack the system users are forced never 
to make Dlaintexts public and must, in fact, rephrase 
every message before public release. From a business 
standpoint such a system is not verv Dractical since manv 
messages  which  are  initially  secret  may be slated for 
17 
eventual public release, e.g., new product announcements. 
The chosen plaintext attack Is not easily implemented 
since it requires the cryptanalyst to first plant a 
plaintext in the system and then intercept the resulting 
cryptogram. 
The last thirty years have seen both cryptography and 
cryptanalysis advance phenomenally primarily due to the 
advent of the electronic comDuter. The cryptoorapher has 
been in a constantly accelerati.no race with technology. 
The ever decreasing ratio of cost to computational power 
aids both the cryptoloaist and the cryptanalyst. The 
ability to break a cryptosystem bv enumeration of all 
possible solutions has become a real threat due to the 
computer. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPUTERS AND CPYPTHLOGY 
2.1 SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Two important issues for any oraanization usinq a 
computer are security and privacy. The latter can only be 
insured when the former is well provided. The aim of 
security is to prevent somethinq from being lost (stolen) 
or misused. For a computer system to be secure it is 
necessary a) to protect the system from environmental 
hazards, b) to protect the system from access by 
unauthorized users, c) to protect the system's stored 
data/information, and d) to Protect the data/information 
while belnq transmitted over the system's communication 
system. Of the four items, (a-d), only item (a) can not 
benefit from cryptology. 
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2.2 USER ACCESS 
There are two types of user access to a computer 
system. First there is access to the actual equipment 
(hardware), secondly there is access to the operating 
system. The difference is essentially the difference 
between crettinq into the machine room, and qettinq "onH 
the system to run programs. The issueing of passwords is 
cryptology used in its simolist form as an aid to 
security. Passwords can be viewed as simple codes. The 
password is merely the codetext equivalent to some 
Plaintext message such as MI am a legitimate user". 
Passwords are used either to limit access to the equipment 
or to the operating system. 
Intense physical security svstems are often not 
practical nor desireable. This is oarticularly true of 
distributed processing systems were it would be extremly 
expensive to secure each remote terminal and each 
communications line by means of physical barriers; and 
where the legitimate users should have quick and easy 
access to the system. 
Passwords are the most common method of preventino an 
unauthorized user from accessing a computer system, 
wilkes [8J states that  to  be  used,  passwords  must  be 
20 
carefully guarded and changed frequently, the printing of 
passwords should be suppressed whenever a user logs onto a 
system; and he identifies the most vulnerable point of a 
password system as the list of passwords stored in the 
computer. In chapter 4 recently proposed cryptographic 
methods of securing the password table, based upon 
"one-way" functions, will be reviewed. 
2.3 STORED DATA/INFORMATION 
Government, military, business organizations, and 
private citizens are or should be concerned about the 
security of data/information contained in computer data 
bases and data banks. Good physical security systems such 
as a vault for tapes and/or disks is the first steD in 
insureing that unauthorized access to data/information is 
prevented. Data encryption is gainina acceptance as a 
means of securing data/information recorded on magnetic 
storage media. The basic idea is to encrvpt Information 
before it is recorded and to decrypt it before use in some 
application. The security of the data deDends upon the 
security of the cryptosystem and its keys. The advantage 
is that it is easier and cheaper to secure a key of a few 
bits  than  a  data  base of several million or more bits. 
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Ehrsam et al [9] distinguishes two classes of key one 
would encounter in a data encryption system. 
KEY-ENCRYPTING keys are used to encinher other keys and 
are defined during the process of initializing the 
cryptosystem. They are changed only at the end of long 
periods (about a year). DATA-ENCRYPTION keys are 
generated dynamically and exist only as long as the data 
they protect. For file security it is Possible that the 
data-encryption key exist for a relatively long time. Any 
data encryption system may use several subclasses of each 
of these two main classes of key. 
2.4 DATA TRANSMISSION 
Communication security has benifited most from 
cryptology and is expected to play an ever increasing role 
as commercial applications, e.g., electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) develope. Cryptoloay can provide a means 
of securing a communications channel so as to provide two 
things to the users: Drivacy* and the capability of 
authenticating messages. When Information can not be 
extracted by unauthorized parties from a message sent over 
a channel connecting two or more nodes of a system, the 
channel  is  said  to  provide  privacy.   If unauthorized 
22 
Injection of messages is not oossible the receiver of a 
message is assured of the legitimacy of the sender; and 
the channel is said to provide authentication capability. 
Ehrsam et al t9] define three Dossibie methods of 
incorporating encryption into a communications system: 
LINK-BY-LINK, NODE-BY-NODE and END-TO-END encryption. 
With link-by-link encryDtion Figure 2.1 the data 
moving between two system nodes is encrypted across the 
channel connecting the nodes. It is logically independent 
of the computer system, and does not necessarily imply the 
existence of a cryptographic caDability at the 
communicating nodes. It can be thought of as Implemented 
by a pair of devices, one at each end of the channel, 
located between the two communicattno nodes and their 
modems (modulators or demodulators) for accomplishing the 
cryDtographic transformation. There is a uniaue key to 
protect the data moving between each pair of nodes, 
therefore messages that traverse several nodes must 
undergo a series of translations from one key to another. 
Node-by-node encryption Figure 2.2 also protects each 
communications channel between nodes by a unioue key. 
However the translation from one key to another occurs 
inside a security device module, which may be peripherally 
23 
attached to the node. Plaintext exists only within the 
security device, not within the node. 
With end-to-end encryption Figure 2.3 the data is 
encrypted at the originating node and is not decrypted 
until it arrives at its final destination. This should be 
contrasted with node-by-node where a message will occur in 
clear form at each node, but only within the security 
device, and with link-by-link where every channel that 
carries encrypted messages must be bracketed by standalone 
cryptographic devices. The cryotooraphic capability is 
integrated Into the participating nodes in a way that 
allows the system to control the setting of keys and 
turnina the cryptosystem on and off. If the encryption 
capability is provided by the host CPU then the capability 
r 
exists to encrypt system resident data, not lust data in 
transit as Is the case with the other two methods. Since 
with end-to-end encryption the routing information 
(provided in a header to the message signal) must remain 
In clear form, it is susceptible to TRAFFIC ANALYSIS - an 
Intelligence gathering technigue which attempts to extract 
useful information from the ouantitv and direction of 
messages in a system. 
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2.5 THE KEY DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM 
In order for a large teleprocessing network to 
provide privacy to all Its users by implementing a 
conventional cryptosystem, it is first necessary for each 
possible pair of users to be given a key to share. The 
number of possible pairs U who may wish to communicate is 
equal to: 
U=(N2- N)/2 (2.1) 
where N is the number of users C6J. If we think in terms 
of an electronic mail system it is easy to imagine N being 
on the order of the number of telephones in  the  country. 
■I 
The catch is that before a pair of users may -use the key 
to secure an insecure channel, the kev must be sent over a 
secure channel. Generally speaking the users will not 
have access to a fast secure channel but must rely on a 
courier. While the use of a courier might not be a matter 
of inconvenience or expense in situations where two 
parties exDect to communicate a great deal over a long 
time, e.g., between an embassy and the State Department 
many  private conversations occur only once between people 
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with no prior acquaintance. No electronic mail system 
that provides privacy will ever succeed if each user must 
wait until a key has been delivered over a slow but secure 
channel. The expense and delay would not be acceptable to 
business or private individuals. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the key distribution problem 
in relation to the overall flow of data/information in 
what is considered a conventional cryptographic system 
C9J. This key distribution problem is the Achilles heel 
of all conventional cryptographic systems including the 
NBS data encryption standard discussed in chapter 3. Not 
until the middle of this decade, with the discovery of 
several possible public-key cryptosvstems has the means 
become available to overcome the key distribution problem. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NBS DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE DES 
Practical applications of technoloqlcal advances in 
the telecommunications industrv, as in many other high 
technology industries, has been hampered by a lack of 
standardization. In 1971 the National Bureau of Standards 
(NBS) Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology 
(ICST) recoanlzed a growing need for data security. The 
NBS concluded that data encryption is the Preferred method 
of protecting electronically communicated data, and in 
some cases, for electronically stored data. To provide 
this cryptographic capability the NBS published in the 
May, 1973 issue of the Federal Register a request for the 
submission of encryption algorithms for computer data 
protection as candidates for use as a Federal  Information 
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Processing Standard. 
In the late sixties IBM had set up a cryptology 
research group led by Horst Feistel. This group produced 
an algorithm which IBM submitted to the NBS. The NBS 
published the algorithm March 17, 1975 and expressed their 
intention to have it considered as a Federal Information 
Processing Standard. The proposed Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) became a Federal standard on July 15, 1977. 
As a Federal standard it applies to all Federal Agencies 
not involved with national security worlc. Over the past 
couole of years the DES has pretty much become the de 
facto standard within private industry. The acceptance of 
the DES has been helped by the appearance in the 
commercial marketplace of several hardware devices from 
IBM, MOTOROLA, and others for implementing the DES. 
The DES can be used either as a block cipher or as a 
stream cipher. For most applications the block cipher 
mode is preferred, and it is the DES operating as a block 
cipher which will be treated here. The DES is designed to 
encipher eight 8-bit EBCDIC (Extended Binary Coded Decimal 
Interchange Code) characters for a total of 64 bits per 
encryption block. There- are conversion considerations 
when using the DES with nonEBCDIC based systems (generally 
32 
nonlBM). The enciphering is under the control of a 56-bit 
key. There are, therefore, 256 possible keys. In general 
the encryption process consists of sixteen seoerate rounds 
of encipherment; in other words the DES is a product 
cipher. The DES represents the state of the art in 
commercially available encryption. While it is public 
knowledge how the DES works, the why, in the form of IBM's 
notes, has been classified by the National Security 
Agency.  This may be a sign of weakness in the standard. 
The key consists of a total of 64 bits, 56 bits for 
use by the algorithm and eight bits are available for 
parity checking if desired. In each round of encipherina 
a subset of 48 bits of the 56-bit key is used. The 
subkeys are derived from a shiftina scheme applied to the 
56-bit key. The deciphering operation uses the 48-bit 
subkeys in reverse order from the enciphering oneration. 
The DES creates a strong intersvsmbol dependence. 
Each ciphertext bit is the result of a comDlex function of 
all plaintext and key bits. Changeing of a single bit of 
ciphertext will cause each subseguent bit of deciphered 
ciphertext to differ from the correct plaintext with a 
probability of 0.5. Ehrsam et al [91 sugaest that by 
appending a short known bit Dattern to a  Plaintext  prior 
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to encryption, and comparing the known bit pattern to the 
decrypted pattern, the true content of the message can be 
checked. If block encryption is used the pattern of test 
bits must be appended to each block of plaintext. Using 
chained block encryption, the test bits need only be 
aDoended to the final block of plaintext; which will 
provide' a significant savings in time and space for 
operation of the cryptosystem. EauiDment currently 
available for implementing the DES can achieve 
encryption/decryption speeds on the order of two million 
bits a second. 
3.2 CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE DES 
The DES has come under attack. Diffie and Hellman 
[10] have claimed that a machine could be built for twenty 
million dollars that could break the DES, i.e., find a 
particular key in about twelve hours. Depreciation of the 
machine over five years would produce an equivalent cost 
per solution of about 5000 dollars. The Droposed method 
of attack consists of nothing more than simple enumeration 
of all Dossible keys, encryption of a known Diaintext, and 
comparison with the actual ciphertext. The proposed 
machine  would  contain approximately one million parallel 
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pairs of a microprocessor, for control and interfacing, 
and a LSI chip, for the calculations, each trying one of 
the 2 = 7.2*10 possible keys each microsecond. An 
exhauslve search would require one day. Since, on 
average, only half the keys need be tried before the 
correct key is found, only half a days time is needed to 
break tihe cipher. 
Both NBS and IBM have objected  fit]  that equipment 
capable  of such a known plaintext attack using exhaustive 
search would not be available until 1990 and even then 
would cost 200 million dollars. 
Oiffie and Hellman [10] concluded that the DES should 
be redesigned with a 128-bit or larger key to rule out 
exhaustive search as a viable crvDtanaiytic attack. 
Tuchman and Meyer [ill, the Principle designers of the 
DES, have responded by concluding that the DES is secure 
for at least five to ten years into the future. They 
suggest SUPEPENCIPHERMENT, the enciphering of an already 
enciphered message, as a means of extending the period 
over which the DES will remain secure. For example, if a 
message is enciphered twice, using two different keys, the 
effect is essentially the same as doubling the key size to 
112-bits.   This  would not complicate the interconnection 
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of old and new equipment the way a change to a larger key 
would. Unfortunately superencipherment only aggravates 
the key distribution problem which the*DES, a conventional 
cryptosystem, is plagued by. 
Several different protocols for the generation, 
distribution, installation, and general management of DES 
keys have been developed, see Ehrsam et al [9], Matyas 
et al [12J, Gladney [13], and Mever et al [143. 
All depend on the use of a courier or similar secure means 
to distribute at least key-encryption keys to the users. 
One suggestion of Matyas et al C123 is to use several 
secure channels and distribute only oart of the key over 
each channel thereby reducing the chance of compromising 
the key. Some critical remarks concerning this idea 
appear in the next section of this chapter. 
3.3 CRITICAL REMARKS ON A KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL 
In light of the arguments of Diffie and Hellman it 
would seem unwise to proceed to use a key even if only a 
portion of it was intercepted since the space over which 
an opDonent must perform an exhaustive search might be 
substantially reduced. In fact, the solution space is 
reduced  by  a  factor  of  two  for  each key bit that is 
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completely known. By "completely known" is meant the 
cryptanalyst knows the value of the bit, whether 0 or 1, 
and also knows the position of the bit within the key. 
For example, if an opponent intercepted one seventh 
of a key, i.e., eiqht bits, and knew which eight bits of 
the 56 it was he/she would have to search: 
56   8     48    47 
(2-2 )/2=2  /2=2 (3.1) 
bit patterns on average before the system was broken. 
Another problem exists when an opponent learns 
information about the parity bits contained in the key. 
Recall that each key contains 56 kev bits and eight parity 
bits for a total of 64 bits. Each group of seven key bits 
has one parity bit associated with it. Tf an opponent 
should intercept a parity bit Dlus knowledge of which 
seven bit section it was associated with he/she would be 
able to substantially reduce the kevspace over which an 
exhaustive search must be made. 
As an example, suppose an opponent learns that an odd 
parity  is  being  used.  This implies that the parity bit 
for each seven bit group is adjusted so that  the  sum of 
all eight bits is odd.  Suppose also that the opponent has 
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learned that the parity bit associated with the first 
seven Key bits is odd (parity bit=l implies odd parity). 
Then, using standard notation the cryotanalyst would know 
not to try the bit patterns shown in Table 3.1 for the 
first seven key bits since the addition of the parity bit 
would indicate even parity which is contradictory to what 
is known. 
0000001 
0000010 
0000100 
0001000 
0010000 
0100000 
1000000 
Table 3.1 
All possible bit configurations with one bit on. 
Similarly all the bit patterns that indicate three bits 
eaual to 1, five bits equal to 1, and all seven bits equal 
to 1 can be ionored.  This amounts to: 
B.fl.fl.fl... 35+21+1=64=2 (3.2) 
where 
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t) n! k =  k'(n-k)! (3.3) 
defines the number of different combinations of  n  thlnas 
taken k at a time without reDitition. 
since 
7   6   6 
2-2 = 2 (3.4) 
the number of keys that need be examined is 
49      6 56 54 
2x2/2=2/2=2 (3.5) 
Therefore it can be seen that complete knowledge of one 
parity bit is equivalent to comDlete knowledqe of one key 
bit. In both cases the keyspace is cut in half. In 
consequence there may actually be a greater risk in 
sending portions of a key over several secure channels. 
For examole, if there is a one in fourteen chance 
that a courier may prove unreliable, one would expect to 
send fourteen keys and lose only one when there is only 
one courier trip per key delivery. If it is decided to 
break each key into seven equal parts and send each part 
with a different courier, i.e., over different secure 
channels one should only safely expect to send one kev out 
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of every two since durinq one of the fourteen courier 
triDS associated with the sending of two keys one of the 
couriers will be bribed, or in some fashion compromise 
his/her portion of the key. While it is true our opponent 
must  still  search  2*'  keys, on averacre, this is a very 
5 6 
very substantial reduction from 2 .  and may not be beyond 
the opponents means. 
If it is known that a portion of a key has~ been 
compromised there is no problem, do not use the key, but 
if one can not expect to know when a Dortion of a key has 
been compromised it may be better, on average, sending an 
entire key over a single secure channel. Increasing the 
number of couriers per key is probably not a better key 
protocol. Consider that if, in the oreceeding example, 
each key had been broken into fourteen oarts and each sent 
over a seperate "secure" channel one would expect a 
portion of every key sent to be compromised. For a given 
syslfVm-*- if the threat environment, i.e., our opponents 
capabilities can be adequately described, and the most 
likely outcomes defined in terms of orobabilities, then 
game theory would provide a means to choose a key 
distribution protocol which minimizes the loss (cost). 
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CHAPTER 4 
PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
4.1 ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that the weakest 
point in a password system is the stored table of 
passwords. According to Wilkes t8), R. M. Needham 
implemented a password system at Cambridge in Enaland 
which avoids the necessity of having such a table. It is 
based on what has come to be known as a one-way function. 
In a cipher system usinq such a function the encryption 
algorithm, which need not be complicated, is chosen such 
that the deciphering algorithm is computational difficult 
to comDute. It should be difficult enough to preclude anv> 
form of attack other than trial and error. 
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Evans et al [15] have proDosed a user authentication 
system similar in concept to Needham's. Essentially the 
system depends upon finding a function H which 
unauthorized users, or anyone for that matter, would find 
difficult to invert. The noninvertibilitv of H would be 
comDletely different from what is normally meant in 
mathematics when one refers to a function as 
"noninvertible". The normal convention is to say a 
function H Is nonlnvertible if a point v is not unique, 
i.e., there exist distinct vectors XI and X2 such that 
H(Xl)=y=H(X2). This is not the type of noninvertibility 
that is needed. Instead, it. must be very very difficult 
given a Doint y and knowledge of the function H to compute 
any vector X with the property that H(X)=y. Once such a H 
is obtained it can be applied to the users password table 
to produce a new table which is then stored in the system. 
Mathematically, when a user enters his/her proffered 
password P' the system computes H(P') and compares it with 
HCP) in the stored table. If H(P')=H(P) then, assuming H 
Is one-to-one, P'=P, the correct password, and the user is 
lodged onto the system. The system orovides security not 
by keeping H and H(P) secret, but by means of the 
computational difficulty of determining P even if H and 
H(P) are known. 
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The problem is to find an H with several 
characteristics. One is that H be one-to-one, i.e., there 
do not exist two distinct passwords Pa and Pb such that 
H(Pa)=H(Pb). The problem here is that broving H is 
one-to-one may be as difficult as proving H has no easy 
inverse, a very complicated task. Tn addition, H should 
not be 'expensive either in time or space to comDute. 
People quickly become impatient and will not accept a lonq 
delay between qiving their password and being logged onto 
a system. Another human-factor consideration is that the 
password be short enough so that it may be easily 
remembered and offered to the system, e.g., typed in at a 
CRT terminal. The problem here is that if the set <P) 
only contains a few thousand items an intruder may gain 
access to the system by trying each possible P. 
Purdy [161 suggests the use of sparse polynomials 
over a prime modulus as a candidate for H. Specifically, 
let p(x) be the polynomial given by: 
p(x)= xn+ a,xn+: +a  ,x+a 
1 n-1   1 
(4.1) 
where n,a,,....,a   are integers;  and let 0  be  a  large 1       n 
prime.   U  is  said  to be congruent v modulo 0 if U-v is 
exactly divisible by 0.  This is written U= VCmod 0).   As 
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an example, 25=l(mod 12). Define H(x) as the unique 
number such that H(x) = p(x)(mod 0) and l<H(x)<0. H(x) 
then provides a mapping from the set (1,2,...,Q} into 
itself. Purdy claims that functions such as H(x) have a 
degree of deaeneracy that does not exceed the degree n of 
the polynomial p(x). A highly degenerate .function would 
produce' the same value of H(P) for many distinct passwords 
P, an undesireable characteristic. Purdy claims that 
finding the roots of such a function can not be done by 
interative methods, such as Newton's: and that such 
methods are no better than trial and error. For practical 
values for the prime 0 and the degree n a Dolynomial root 
finder would reguire on the order of > 102 years to crack 
the system assumino 10  machine operations per second. 
While such systems provide authentication capability 
they offer no solution to the problem of insuring privacy. 
In fact, such systems will easily succomb to a strong 
effort at discovering a legitimate password via 
wiretapplnq. 
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4.2 PUBLIC-KEY CFYPTOSYSTEM DEFINED 
Consider a cryptosystem In which the following three 
properties are found: 
(a) There exists a deciphering procedure D such that when 
it is applied to the enciphered form of a plaintext M the 
result is M.  Formally, 
D(E(M))=M 
(b) Both the enciphering procedure (algorithm and key) E, 
and the deciphering procedure (algorithm and key) D are 
easily computed. 
(c) A user may publicly reveal E and not reveal an easy 
method to compute D. 
An encryption/decryption function satisfying 
conditions (a)-(c) is a "trap-door one-way function". In 
similarity with the one-way functions described in section 
4.1 it is easv to compute In one direction, but very hard 
to invert. However it would be trao-door because this 
one-wayness is only perceived. In fact, the inverse is 
easily comDuted once certain secret trao-door information 
is known. This trap-door information is very very 
difficult to discover, but is known to the system's 
designers who intentionally designed it into the system. 
Should the designer forget the  trao-door  information  he 
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would  be  as  unable  as  anyone to oerform the inversion 
\Odecipherinq). 
In order for a cryptosystem to provide full 
authentication capability, a fourth oroperty must belong 
to the system. Namely, E(D(M))=M when D(E(M))=M. In a 
cryotosystem with this property every messaae is the 
ciphertext for some other message and every ciphertext is 
a permissible message. Functions satisfying all four of 
these DroDerties are called "traP-door one-way 
permutations". 
CryDtosystems with these properties are called 
PUBLIC-KEY cryptosystems. A concept invented by Diffie 
and Hellman [6]. In operation each user would generate 
two cryptographic procedures E and D. The enervation 
procedure E would be made public D, the decryption 
procedure (actually only the key), would be kept secret. 
In order for a user A to send a user B a messaae, A must 
remove B's E from a system-public file and encryDt the 
message M by E(M)=c, and then send B the ciohertext C. B 
would then be able to read M after decrypting it with 
his/her secret D by DCC)=M. 
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It should be apparent that users of a public-key 
cryptosystem are able to establish orlvate communication 
over an insecure channel without havina to first send a 
secret key over a secure channel. This freedom from the 
key distribution problem makes a public-key cryptosystem 
ideal for use with electronic mail systems. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the flow of information in a public-key 
cryptosystem. Note that instead of a shielded channel 
between each pair of users for the distribution of keys, 
there are only shielded channels between the users and the 
generator of the secret key D for secure transmission of 
D. If D can be generated in house this represents no 
problem at all. 
\ 
To date, in all proposed public-kev cryDtosystems the 
decryption and encryption procedures share an algorithm, 
which may be made public with the encryption key; only 
the decryption key need be kept secret. It is conceivable 
that a public-key cryptosystem could be developed that 
uses two distinct algorithms, a Dublic encryption 
algorithm, and a secret decryption alaoritm. These could 
share a common public key. Such a system would be 
difficult to implement because of the lack of 
standardization. Also, generating two one-way trap-door 
functions based  upon  different  algorithms  which  would 
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allow E(D(M))=D(E(M)) Is probably extremely difficult. 
4.3 SIGNATURES AND RECEIPTS 
In order for electronic mall systems to compete with 
the existing paper mail system some method must be found 
to produce an electronic, diqital equivalent to the 
written signature. This is necessary for buisness 
transactions, and other situations, e.g., a doctor 
prescribing drugs, where authentication is required. In 
addition to merely verifying that a messaqe came from a 
particular  sender,  the system should protect aqainst the 
threat of dispute. 
The major disputes that may arise over a messaqe are: 
1. The sender may deny ever having sent a messaae when in 
fact one was sent. 
2. The receiver may deny ever havinq received a message 
when in fact one was received. 
3. The claim may be made that a messaae was sent- when in 
fact none was sent. 
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4.  The claim may be made that a messaae was received when 
in,fact none was received. 
DisDutes 1 and 3 may arise legitimatelv in the case where 
a third party may forge and inject unauthorized messages 
into the system. Disputes 2 and 4 may arise legitimately 
in the case where a third party intercepts a messaae and 
does not allow it to continue on to its destination. 
Cryptology can not prevent the latter situation, that is a 
problem of physical security, but it can prevent the 
intercepted message from being understood. 
To avoid dispute 1 a receiver can demand that the 
sender sign a message. with a public-key cryptosystem 
this can be accomplished by having the sender S encrVDt 
the message to be sent, either plaintext or ciphertext, 
using Ds (the sender's decryption key).  In this way: 
Msigned=Ds(M) 
or if privacy is also desired 
Csigned=Ds(C) 
where 
or similarly, 
where 
C=ErCM) 
Csigned=Er(C) 
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\ 
CsDs(M). 
^ 
The receiver R could later prove that S sent Msigned 
by applying the sender's public Es to it to recover M. 
That is, 
Es(Msigned)=Es(Ds(M))=M 
or in the case where the message has been encrypted 
Es(Csigned)=Es(Ds(C))=C=Er(M) 
where 
Dr(Er(M))=M 
or similarly 
Dr(Csigned)=Dr(Er(C))=C=Ds(M) 
where 
Es(Ds(M))=M 
It is apparent that Msigned must uniguelv identify M 
since electronically a signature could be attached to any 
message whatsoever. 
To avoid dispute 2 it is necessary for the sender to 
get the receiver to return a receipt tn the form of the 
sent message encrypted using the receiver's secret 
decryption key. If M is sent the receiver returns Dr(M), 
if C Is sent the receiver returns Dr(C). In court S can 
prove R received M or C by decryptina nrCM") or Dr(C) using 
P's public Er to produce M or C, the message s claims R to 
50 
have received. 
In dispute 3 the burden of proof is on the supposed 
sender to produce a signed receipt as described above. 
The sender will be unable to forge a receipt not knowing 
Dr. 
In dispute 4 the burden of proof is on the supposed 
receiver to produce a signed message from the sender who 
is claimed to have sent it. The receiver win be unable 
to forge the senders signature, not knowing Ds. 
In cases where a user allows his/her D to be 
compromised a court will probably allow a grace period of 
a reasonable amount of time in which thp user could report 
the loss, after which the user would become liable for 
damages caused by the unauthorized use of D. This would 
be analogous to the situation existing with credit cards. 
4.4 THE RSA PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM 
At present there are only a few contenders for a 
public-key cryptosystem. The trap-door knapsack system of 
Merkle and Hellman [17], and the svstem invented by 
Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman [18] (henceforth referred to 
as the RSA system) have received the most attention. 
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The trap-door knapsack system relys on the 
NP-comoleteness of the famous knaosack or caroo loadinq 
problem. In this system each user U deposits in a public 
file a trap-door knapsack vector A('H. When someone 
wishes to send the Uth user a messaqe In the form of a 
vector X, he/she reads A(U) from the DUblic file and 
computes S=X*A(U). Only the intended recipient can 
recover X from S. 
NP (nondeterministic, polynomial) problems are 
solvable . in polynomial time on a computer with an 
unlimited deqree of parallelism. Tt is relatively easy to 
check a ouessed solution to an NP problem of size n, the 
number of computational  steps,  and  therefore  the  time 
required  increases  proportionaly  to  a Dolynomial in n, 
2  3 
e.g., n +n.  The  best  method  for  findinq  the  correct 
solution, however increase in time much more rapidly as n 
grows, usually proportional to an exponential function in 
n, e.g., 3n +2" Problems in the comolexity class NP are 
qood candidates for constructinq trao-door one-way 
functions. 
Since the primary task of this thesis is to write a 
set of FORTRAN programs for encrvDtino and decryptlnq 
messages  by  the  RSA  method  using   the   DECsystem-20 
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computer, and to use these to investicrate a proposed 
cryptanalvtic attack of the RSA system, space will be 
taken here to fully explain the RSA cryptosystem. This 
discussion is taken in part from'[181. 
The RSA system uses a public encryption key E=(e,n) 
and a secret decryption key D=(d,n), d, e, and n are 
positive intecrers. The message M to be encrypted must 
first be represented as a number between 0 and n-i. M=0 
and M=l will be encrypted into themselves. It may be 
necessary to break the messaqe into a series of blocks. 
To encryot M raise it to the e-th power modulo n. 
Formally. 
C = ECM) EMe(mod n) C4.2) 
Decryption is achieved in  like  manner  replacing  M 
with the ciphertext C, and e with d.  Formally. 
M =DCC) = Cd(mod n) (4.3) 
The encrypted form of a messaqe or block of a message 
will also be in the ranqe 0 to n-1. The n is the product 
of two very large randomly selected prime numbers P and 0. 
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The security of the system resides in the fact that while 
it is easy to compute the product of two numbers it is 
very difficult to decompose a given number; into its 
prime factors. This difficulty of factoring n hides P and 
0 and hence the way d can be computed from e. Rivest et 
al in [18) include a table, which is reproduced here, of 
the time required to prime factor numbers as the length 
(number of digits) grows. The values in table 4.1 are 
based upon what Rivest et al consider to be the fastest 
factoring algorithm known. 
DIGITS 
50 
75 
100 
200 
300 
500 
NUMBER OF OPERATIONS 
10 1.4 x 10 
9.0 X 10 12 
2.3 X 10 
1.2 X 10 
1.5 X 10 
1.3 X 10 
15 
23 
29 
39 
TIME 
3.9 hours 
104 days 
74 years 
9 
3.8 x 10 years 
4.9 x 10 years 
4.2 x 10 years 
Table 4.1 
Factoring time based on one operation Der microsecond, 
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The integer e is picked from a large  enough  set  to 
preclude  its  discovery by trial and error.  It is chosen 
to satisfy 
0 
gcd(e,(P-l)*(0-l))=1 (4.4) 
where Mgcd" is an abreviation for greatest common divisor. 
Any prime number greater than max(P,Q) will do. 
Experience indicates that if a smaller number is desired 
it does not reguire more than a few trials before an e 
satisfying the above relation is found. 
The integer d is computed from P, 0, and e so as to 
be the multiplicative inverse of e, moduloC(P-l)*(Q-1)). 
That is 
e*d = 1(mod(P-l)*(0-1)). (4.5) 
The correctness of choosing  d  in  this  fashion  can  be 
demonstrated  using  an  identity due to Euler and Fermat. 
For any integer M which is relatively Drime to n, i.e.   n 
@(n) 
and  M  have no common factors other than I, M   Hrnod n). 
Where  ?(n) is Fuler's totient function which defines  the 
number   of  positive  integers  less  than  n  which  are 
relatively crime to n.  In the case of a prime  number  P, 
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0(P)=P-1    By   elementary   properties  of  the  totient 
function: 
e(n)= §(P)* 0(0) 
e(n)=(P-l)*(0-t) 
Because e is relatively prime to the totient  function  of 
n, it has a multiplicative inverse in the rina of integers 
modulo' P(n) and equation 4.5 holds. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PROGRAMMING THE RSA PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM 
5.1 MULTIPLE-PRECISION OPERATIONS 
In [181 P.ivest states, "an 80-diglt n provides 
moderate security against an attack usinq current 
technology...". The goal chosen, therefore, was to 
develooe an encryption/decryption Droaram that could 
utilize at least an 80-digit n. Arithmetic on 80-digit 
numbers is beyond the working Drecision of all 
commercially available computers? even beyond the the 
double-orecision routines available on such large word 
size machines as the CDC 6400. The DECsvstem-20 computer 
was chosen as the machine on which the public-key 
cryptosystem would be developed. The reasons for this 
were: 
58 
1. The author was familiar with it 
2. The excellent interactive operating system. 
3. The existing electronic mail capability. 
4. It is a more conventional system than the other main 
computer available at Lehiah University, the CDC 6400, 
While the CDC 6400 would provide much greater speed 
of execution, its Door interactive operating system (at 
Lehigh) plus the fact that the entire ASCII character set 
can not be used ruled it out as the machine for this 
project. 
The DECsystem-20 allows integers to be represented 
within the range of (-2**35)+l to (+2**35)-l (-34359738367 
to +34359738367). This dictates that multiprecision 
arithmetic  operations be programmed.  Double-precision on 
t
--' 
the DECsystem-20 would not simplify thinos, because double 
precision constants are similar to real constants, and 
secondly, depending upon their magnitude there is only 
precision of 16 to 18 places. Pure integer 
double-precision is unfortunately not available. In any 
case, double-precision operations reguire nearly twice the 
time of single-precision  operations.   The  time  savings 
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would not be as great as one might assume. 
In order to implement the RSA cryptosystem it was 
necessary to Drogram all the conventional arithmetic 
-^ operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
division, and modulo) in multiple-precision for positive 
integers. In general the classical algorithms were used. 
Flowcharts of these algorithms appear in APPENDIX I. 
Programs were written in FORTRAN because it is a very 
"portable" language, unlike assembler or machine language. 
In the programs a multiprecision variable or constant is 
stored in a FORTRAN dimensioned array. Rach array element 
stores 4 digits (if possible) of the value of the variable 
or constant. For example, the number 1,234,567,890 would 
be stored in the elements of the array N as: 
N(l)=7890 N(2)=3456 N(3)=0012 
Addition, modulo, subtraction, and division would have 
benefited from storing more diqjts oer array element (the 
DECsystem-20 permits the storaae of all possible inteaers 
up to 10 digits long in one FORTRAN integer array element, 
or constant), but the multiplication algorithm used could 
produce an overflow condition if more than 4 digits are 
stored. In addition an inteaer variable must be 
maintained that indicates how many array elements are used 
by a number, to prevent unnecessary  operations  on  empty 
60 
(equal to zero) array elements. 
Knuth [19 ChaDter 4] offers several algorithms which 
would execute in significantly less time, but these can 
only practicaly be implemented when Droarammed in machine 
or assembler language on a bit addressable processor. 
These algorithms are designed to take advantage of the 
binary arithmetic used by the processor. Unfortunately 
the binary representations of a number requires about 3.4 
times as many digits as the base 10 representation. Since 
with a high level language such as FORTRAN the registers, 
accumulator, and condition flaos are not directly 
addressable to perform binary arithmetic, numbers must be 
converted to their binary representations with each digit 
stored in a seperate variable or array element. This is a 
highly inefficient use of storage. The binary arithmetic 
operations would have to programmed; and variables would 
have to be set aside to act as the condition flags (carry, 
zero, etc.). In essence a FORTRAN simulation of a binary 
processor would have to be developed to ImDiement the fast 
algorithms in FORTRAN. This would be highly inefficient. 
Assembler language was not used since it is much more 
machine dependent than FORTRAN. 
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5.2 PRIME NUMBERS 
The RSA cryptosystem reaulres the caDabillty of 
generating large prime numbers. Recall that n in the 
encryption orocess C=Me(mod n) and in the decryption 
process M=C (mod n) is the product of two primes P and 0. 
The security of the system resides in the difficulty of 
determining P and Q from n. P and Q should not be 
discoverable by direct search over the known primes. 
Conseguently both P and Q should be large. 
Fortunately the problem of findina large primes (with 
reasonable certainty of primality) is nowhere near as 
difficult a problem as prime factoring a  number.   Tables 
of  prime  numbers exist which contain all the primes less 
9 than 10 , but for larger numbers one must resort to  tests 
for primality. 
The number of primes is infinite, unfortunately the 
distribution of primes follows no aooarent pattern.' The 
number of primes less than some number N as N 
aDproaches Infinity is derived from the formula: 
lim TT(N)ln N 
N-*»     N    "l (5.1) 
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which Is the Drime number theorem. From this it is 
possible to approximate the expected number of numbers Z 
between consecutive primes for some arbitrary point in the 
integers N as. 
In N=z (5.2) 
Since all prime numbers other than 2 are odd, 50% of 
Z may be discarded automatically. Another 10% consisting 
of all the integers ending in a 5 may also be discarded 
since any integer ending in 5 is divisible by 5. 
Therefore, only 40% of Z need be checked before one would 
expect to find a prime. For example, for n=10 Z*.40=10, 
and for n=10   Z*.40=92. 
It is possible to prove that a number P is prime by 
the following converse to a theorem by Fermat. 
THEOREM:  If there exists a number X for which  the  order 
of X modulo P is egual to P-l, then P ts crime. 
The order of X modulo P is the smallest positive Integer k: 
such that Xkmod P=l.  The order of X will be P-l iff: 
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1. XP_1mod P=l and, 
2. XP~1/Qmod P=l for all primes Q which divide P-l. 
Unfortunately It Is necessary to know the prime factors of 
P-l. This can easily be a severe limitation. It is 
necessary then to look for a method that will identify a 
number as prime with a probability hiqh enough for the 
apolication at hand. 
Rivest et al tl8) suggest a "probabalistic" algorithm 
due to Solovay and Strassen [20 and 21]. This algorithm 
tests a number P for primality by testing whether: 
gcd(A,P) = l  and  J(A,P)=AP"1^mod P) (5.3) 
where A is randomly chosen from a uniform distribution on 
{1,...,P-1>, and J(A,P) is the .Jacobi symbol. If P is 
prime it win always satisfy the conditions given above. 
If P is composite it will falsely satisfy the conditions 
with a probability at most .5. Rivest et al suggest that 
100 random values for A be tried. if P passes the test 
for all 100 then there is a chance of only one in 2 that 
P is not prime. This algorithm was not used for two 
reasons.  First, because of the difficulty of  calculating 
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J(A,P)  in reasonable  amount  of  time, and secondly, 
100: because a reliability of one in 2*""is unnecessary. 
The method chosen for determininq if a number P is 
prime consisted of five steps. First, all even numbers 
and numbers  ending  in  a  5  are  not  even  considered. 
Secondly,  the ocd(P,A.) is calculated as in Solovay's and 
' x 
Strassen's method.  This was modified so that  instead  of 
100  random  A   the A  were chosen so that as i=lf2,...,5 
the A  are 8 or 7 digit integers which are the products of 
all prime numbers less than 103 (except 2) used only once, 
i.e., each A. uses a subset of the primes less than 103 as 
its  factors.   The problem of fittina 1 factors X. into i 
j 
products A so that each X is used only once and each A 
does not exceed some maximum value can be treated as a 
knapsack problem and is easily solved bv recallina that 
the log of a product is equal to the sum of the logs of 
its factors. This step guickly eliminates integers with 
small  prime  factors.  Lehmer [221 determined that 90% of 
7 ft the 90 million numbers between 10 and 10 have prime 
factors < 313. Of course Lehmer's ranoe Included the even 
integers all of which possess 2 as a Drime factor and 
integers ending in a 5, all of which possess 5 as a prime 
factor. The third step was to calculate ocd(P,A ) where 
i=6,7,...,95 and the A  are randomly selected on the range 
65 
{1,...,P-1>. If a number is prime its acd with any number 
less than' itself is always 1. According to a theorem by 
E.  Cesaro: 
THEOREM: if P and A are integers chosen at random, the 
probability that qcd(P,A)=l is 6/^2. 
While by this step P cannot be considered randomly 
selected, and the probability of gcd(P,Ai)=l is probably 
greater than 6/^ 2, one should expect that after being 
tested against 95 h^ P is composite with low probability. 
The fourth step utilizes the previously stated converse to 
the theorem of Fermat. Mathematically when P is not 
prime, it is always possible to find an A<P such that 
A mod P=l. Nearly 25 centuries aqo the Chinese 
discovered that for the case A = 2, if 2 mod P=l then P is 
prime. Unfortunately this is wrong, there are exceptions, 
but they are rare. . For example, of all the numbers less 
than 50 million only 1511 satisfy the test which are not 
prime. This is very significant if one considers that 
there are approximately 3 million prime numbers less than 
50,000,000. The fifth step consists of performing the 
calculation of the fourth steD using four different values 
of A to, hopefully,  eliminate  candidates  for  orimality 
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that pass step four.  , 
One could probably acheive satisfactory results usinq 
just steps four and five, but since these require 
siqnificantly more time to calculate than the gcd the 
preliminary elimination is desireable. 
5.3 PROGRAM PRIME 
Program PRIME is the FORTRAN proqram written to find 
large prime numbers by the five steDS given in section 
5.2. Copies of PRIME, as well as all Drograms written for 
this thesis are stored in the Industrial Enqineerinq 
Department at Lehiqh University. 
The calculation of gcd(P,A.) was accomplished using 
Euclid's algorithm which for positive Inteqers consists of 
two steps: 
1. If A divides P, STOP with A as the answer. 
2. If P mod A Is eaual to 1  A and P are relatively prime 
so STOP, otherwise make P=A and A=P mod A and return 
to step 1. 
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The calculation of AP"1 mod P is essentially the same 
as what Is required for the RSA encryption/decryption 
process. The effecient technique used Is one called 
"exponentiation by repeated squaring and multiplication". 
The steps are: ' 
1. Let PkPk_i•••.PiP0 be the binary representation of 
P-l. 
2. Set the variable C to 1. 
3. For i=k,k-l,....,0. set C=C mod P and if p =1 set 
C=CC*A) mod P. 
4. STOP now C=AP-1mod P. 
The reliability of PRIME was tested in two ways. First 
the proqram was run to qenerate all the prime numbers 
between 10,000,439 and 10,006,721. The result was checked 
against Lehmer [23], PRIME identified all 400 primes in 
the range and did not falsely identify any composite 
number as prime. This run reauired approximately 3.5 
minutes of CPU time. Second, the first 50 entries in 
Lehmer's [22], "Table of Composite Solutions n of Fermat's 
Congruence 2n=2(mod n) and Their Smallest Prime Factor o" 
were  checked.   PPIME  correctly identified each of these 
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numbers as composite. This test was used to determine 
that step 5 of the selection process be done for 4 A in 
addition to 2. It takes approximately half a minute of 
CPU time to find a 40-digit prime usina PRIME. 
5.4 PROGRAM NEXTPR 
Rivest et al suggest that to afford additional 
protection against sophisticated factoring algorithms, the 
factors of n, i.e. P and .Q, should differ in length by a 
few digits, and P-l and 0-1 should each possess at least 
one large orime factor. In addition, qcd(P-l,0-l) should 
be small. Finding a prime number P such that P-l has a 
large prime factor is not difficult. Program MEXTPR 
accomplishes just that using the prime identifying logic 
of program PRIME, and the suggestion in [18] to Generate a 
prime  number  U, and then let P be the first prime in the 
seguence (i*U)+l, for i=2,4,6,8, , and  similarly  for 
0. NEXTPR can do this in about a minute of CPU time 
for a 40-digit U. One may find it necessary to try 
several values for U before a P the desired number of 
digits is found. 
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5.5 PROGRAM EFIND 
Determininq e (actually whether one starts by 
choosinq e or choosinq d Is a matter semantics since the 
RSA system relys on a one-way trao-door permutation 
function) is accomplished by findinq a number relatively 
prime to P(n). The smaller the e, the larqer the d will 
be and conversly. Recall thouqh that d should come from a 
set larqe enouqh to preclude discovery by direct search. 
Proqram EFIND calculates the first number e, which is 
relatively prime to P(n), after some user supplied auess 
for e. @(n) is determined by the P and Q supplied by the 
user. EFIND allows the user to specify a lower bound on 
e. Euclid's alqorithm as outlined in section 5.3 is used 
to calculate the gcd of @(n) and each value of e tried by 
the proqram until the qcd=l;  impiyinq relative primality. 
5.6 PROGRAM KEY 
Proqram KEY accepts as input a U and a P (found usinq 
PRIME and NEXTPR), and an e (found usinq EFIND) and 
qenerates a decryption exponent 6, and n=P*Q. KEY stores 
d and n in a decryption key file specified by the user, 
and e and n in an encryption key  file  also  user  named. 
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The key files are set up by KEY to be used by proqram RSA, 
the encryption/decryption program. 
The  calculation  of  d  Is  accomollshed   uslnq a 
variation  on  Euclid's  algorithm  for  computinq the gcd 
presented earlier.  The program calculates qcd(ia(n),e) by 
computinq  a  series xn,Xj ,X2. ...,   where xn=<a(n), Xj=d and 
x = x  fmod x.), until an x, equal to zero is found.  Then 
i+1 i-1     i k 
gcd(x ,x. )=x  ,   A  series  of numbers b  are computed by 
0  1   k-I i 
b =b  -t*b   for i>l, where t  is  the  quotient  produced 
i  i-2   i-1 
during the calculation of gcd(x ^x .). To beqin b =1, 
bo=0. The b are calculated so as to provide a solution 
to: 
Xi = ai % +bi *X1 (5.4) 
Where the a can be calculated similarly to the b . Note 
that it is not necessary to calculate the a . When x =0, 
x. .equals 1 and b. .equals d, the multiplicative inverse 
of e, modulo ®(n). The program produces an error messaqe 
if the d found is neqative, in which case another e or 
P(n) should be tried. This calculation requires less than 
a minute of CPU time for n<80-diqits. One final note: if 
the d found or e chosen is less than loq (n) not every 
message will be reduced modulo n.  A  quick  idea  of  the 
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magnitude of e and d required can be had by using a pocket 
calculator, and the following relation if logs to the base 
2 can not be gotten directly on the calculator used. 
Log1Q(n) 
Log2(n)= LogJJJTT) (5.5) 
In a working system the encryption key file would be 
stored in a public directory and the decryption file would 
be stored in the user's private directory. On the 
DECsystem-20 a directory is a named collection of files. 
A file is a named collection of records containg either 
program code, text, data, etc. A Private directory is 
only accessable by those who know the correct password. A 
public directory is accessable by anvone who can loa onto 
the system. All programs necessary for kev qeneration and 
encryption/decryption would be stored in a public 
directory. 
5.7 PROGRAM PSA 
Program RSA is the encryption/decryption proaram. 
PSA can encrypt any text file composed of the ASCII 
characters given in table 5.1. This set contains all the 
text characters on a standard ASCII keyboard.  RSA prompts 
72 
the user to specify whether encryption or decryption is 
a=oi S = 20 f = 39 y=5R -=77 
A = 02 T = 21 g=40 z=59 .=78 
B = 03 U = 22 h = 41 { = 60 / = 79 
C = 04 V = 23 i = 42 1=61 0 = 80 
D = 05 W = 24 j=43 >=62 1=81 
E = 06 X = 25 k = 44 " = 63 2 = 82 
F = 07 Y=26 1 = 45 = 64 3 = 83 
G = 0 8 Z = 27 n>=46 !=65 4 = 84 
H = 09 [ = 28 n=47 "=66 5 = 85 
1 = 10 \ = 29 o=48 #=67 6 = 86 
J=ll ]=30 P = 49 S = 6fl 7 = 87 
K = 12 " = 31 a=50 * = 69 8 = 08 
L = 13 -=32 r = 51 & = 70 9 = 89 
M = 14 %=33 s = 52 '=71 :=90 
N=15 a = 34 t = 53 (=72 ;=9l 
H=16 b = 35 u = 54 )=73 < = 92 
P = 17 c = 36 v=55 * = 74 = = 93 
0=18 d = 37 w = 56 + = 75 > = 94 
R = 19 e = 38 x=57 
Table 
,=76 
5.1 
? = 95 
ASCII characters and their assigned numerical values. 
desired, then requests t,he SDecification of the file 
containinq the appropriate Key. If encrvDtion is desired 
the user is requested to supply the soeclfication of the 
file containing the plaintext. RSA encrypts and decrypts 
message files one record (block) at a time. Since for 
encryption each ASCII character is converted to a two 
digit number (see table 5.1) there is a 2 to 1 expansion 
of the text. Because of this It may be necessary to 
reblock the plaintext file (change the number of plaintext 
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characters per record) so that when each record Is 
converted to a number the result is less than n. After 
reading the encryption key file PSA calculates the maximum 
number of characters (left justified) per record that can 
be encrypted based upon the n in the key file. The user 
must specify the number of characters per record to be 
encrypted. If the user's text Hie contains more 
characters per record than may be encrypted based upon the 
n in the key file the user must stoo execution and reblock 
his/her text file. Finally RSA requests the user to 
supply the ciphertext file specification of the file into 
which the encrypted form of the messaae will be written. 
The first record of the ciohertext file contains the 
number of ASCII characters per record of the plaintext 
file. This information is needed by RSA to insure an 
exact reproduction of the Plaintext file during 
decryption. Each remaining record contains a 2-digit 
number that specifies the length (number of array elements 
required) of the ciphertext number that is the encrypted 
form of a aiven plaintext record. These ciphertext 
numbers follow the lengths after two blank spaces in the 
record. Mote that the ciphertext is not converted back to 
its alphanumeric version, there is no ooint. 
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Durinq decryption the user is requested to supply the 
specification of the decryption key file, the ciphertext 
file, and a file into which RSA can write  the  deciphered 
message.   See  APPENDIX  II for a samole execution of RSA 
? 
and the other programs. 
RSA can encrypt messages using an n up to 160-diqits 
long. This implies that 80 characters of text per file 
may be encrypted. A plaintext or ciohertext file may 
contain any number of records, the only limit beinq the 
disk space alloted for a user's directory. 
In order to test the speed and reliability of RSA the 
test plaintext file shown in table 5.7 was used. 
RECORD PLAINTEXT 
1 GENESIS 11:7 Go to, let us ao down, and 
2 there confound their lanquaoe, that they 
3 may not understand one another's speech. 
4 PABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\J *_%abcde 
5 fahijklmnopqrstuvwxyzd>~ !"#s%&*()*+,-. 
6 /0123456789:;<=>?  It's all Greek to me. 
Record start Record end 
Table 5.2 
Test plaintext file. 
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This file consisted of 6 records of 40 characters each 
(blanics are considered characters) for a total of 240 
characters. The file was reblocked for tests with 
different size n. Table 5.3 gives the number of 
characters per record and the number of records per file 
for the nine versions of the test plaintext file used. 
CHARACTERS/RECORD: 
RECORDS/FII.'E: 
4   6 8  10  12  16  20 
60  40 30  24  20  15  12 
Table 5.3 
Dimensions of test Plaintext files. 
30  40 
8   6 
RSA encrypts and decrypts by using the efficient 
algorithm for raising a number to an Inteoer power and 
reducincr the result modulo some inteqer aiven in section 
5.3. In prime the algorithm was used to calculate 
Ap~1mod P, in RSA A is replaced by M or C, the numerical 
verions of the plaintext or ciphertext respectively, P-l 
is replaced by e or d, depending on whether encryption or 
decryption is desired, and (mod P) is replaced by (mod n). 
The beauty of the alaorithm is that since the reduction 
modulo n is carried out while the power Is being evaluated 
C (in the algorithm) never grows  laraer  than  twice  the 
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length of n. 
When a record of the plaintext file is read each 
character is stored in a seperate array element. In order 
to convert a character to its 2-digit numerical equivalent 
and vice versa, a simple binary seauential search is 
performed using the computer's internal ordering of the 
different characters. Blanks were assigned the value 64 
rather than 00 because that is where they fit sequentially 
as ordered by the DECsystem-20 computer, but more 
importantly, because making a blank equal to 00 would 
'result in loosina information about the number of leading 
blanks in a plaintext record. 
In order to test the execution time of RSA, two tests 
were devised. 
1. Using increasing values of n, determine the encryption 
time necessary to encipher the 240-character test 
Plaintext file (reblocked for each n) as e is held 
constant. The n will be similar, i.e., having the same 
leading digits. 
2. For the test plaintext file using 20-character blocks 
and a constant n, determine the encryption time for 
increasing values of e. 
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These two tests provided results which will allow one to 
determine a good approximation to the execution time of 
RSA for a given block size and size of e. The results are 
also applicable to the decryption process since the same 
type of calculations are performed. 
For the first experiment nine P and 0 pairs had to be 
found whose Droducts, i.e., the different n, would have 
similar leading digits. Similar leading digits were 
desired to eliminate variations that might occur using 
different leading digits. The leadina dlaits of n govern 
how the division proceeds during the reduction modulo n of 
the encryption/decryption process. The P and Q pairs were 
chosen so that the 9 n produced were each one digit longer 
than two times the number of characters/record oiven in 
table 5.3. An n that is twice the block size digits long 
could be used, but if just four more characters are added 
to the character set and assigned the remainina two digit 
values of 96,97,98,and 99 it would be possible to have a 
plaintext record that would convert to a string of nines. 
Using an n one digit longer  than  twice  the  block  size 
eliminates  any  restrictions  on the values of any of the 
i 
digits of n. The P and 0 pairs and the Droducts n along 
with the prime factorizations (where known) of P-l and 0-1 
are given in table 5.4. 
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For 4 characters/record: 
P=982063 
P-l=2*3*3*54559 
0=557 
0-1 = 2*2*13.9 
n=547009091 
For 6 characters/record: 
P=98765531 
P-l=2*5*9876553 
0=54539 
0-1=2*27269 
n=5386573295209 
For 8 characters/record: 
P=987654319J 
P-l=2*5*987654319 
0=5432411 
0-1=2*5*543241 
n=53653441872763501 
For 10 characters/record: 
P=987654321371 
P-l=2*5*98765432137 
0=543202691 
0-1=2*5*54320269 
n=536496485146506009361 
For 12 characters/record: 
P=98765432109431 
P-l=2*5*98765 4 3210943 
0=54321090767 
0-1=2*27160545383 
n=5365046002258377627723577 
P and 0 
and the 
pairs, the 
products n 
Table 5.4 
prime factorizations of P-l and 0-1 
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For 16 characters/record: 
P=987654321098763611 
P-1=2*5*98765432109876361 
0=543210987662831 
0-1=2*5*54 32109876628 3 
n=536504679233522206919208640042741 
For 20 characters/record: 
P=9876543210987654321067 
P-1=2*3*1646090535164609053511 
0=5432109876543211691 
0-l=2*5'*54321 0987654321169 
n=53650467922511842490417299041562261994297 
For 30 characters/record: 
P=98765432109876543210987654321179 
0=54 3210987654 3210987654321097 9 
n=536504679225118 3554 3965862421064160799969669291245252250 
24241 
For 40 characters/record: 
P=987654321098765432109876543210987654321083 
0=54 321098765 4 3210987 6543210987654 3210121 
n=536504679225118 35543965862 429568054044877 607292993126050 
4241411371548969669281043 
Table 5.4 cont. 
Examination of the algorithm used to accomplish the 
exponentiation and reduction modulo n indicates that each 
time a diait of the binary representation of e is equal to 
a one there is a multiplication by M and a reduction 
modulo n that does not occur when a binary digit of e 
equals zero, and similarly for d. One would expect that 
an e or d with a binary representation with a low density 
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of ones would cause RSA to execute sianificantly faster 
than an e or d of similar or possibly smaller magnitude 
that possesed a high density of ones in its binary 
representation. Talcing this into consideration the e 
chosen for experiment 1 was picked to have roughly an 
egual number of zeroes and ones. The e chosen was 
178,956,847 which in binary is 
1010101010101010101000101111. 
Table 5.5 contains the results of experiment 1 for 
ecryption using the values of P, 0, and n given in table 
5.4 using e=178,956,847, and also for decryption using the 
various values of d found by program KEY. The CPU times 
are given as MINUTES:SECONDS.TENTHS OF SECONDS. Figure 
5.1 is a plot of the values in table 5.5 for encrypting 
10, 20, 30, and 40 characters of text. Note the linear 
relationship. A simple regression eauation fitting these 
points is Y=.7656X+6.96 where Y is the estimate of the CPU 
time and x is the number of characters Der record. The R 
value for this eguation is greater than .99. This 
eguation is for encrypting a 240 character file. Divide Y 
by 240 to get a time per character. Note that the 
decryption times ^increase very raDidly. This is due to 
the fact that since e is held constant the values of d 
must  grow  as n grows if e*d divided by (P-1)*(0-1) is to 
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■"r 
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Characters per Block Encrypted 
Encrypting 240 characters with constant exponent 
e=178956847 and similar leading digits in n. 
CPU TIME .VS. BLOCK SIZE 
Figure 5.1 
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have a remainder of 1.  All times in table 5.5 are averaoe 
values  based  on five executions of RSA for each value of 
n. 
CPU TIME 
CHARACTERS/RECORD ENCRYPTION DECRYPTION 
4 9.74 10.60 
' 6 11.64 15.39 
8 13.34 23.45 
10 14.67 31.70 
12 15.47 40.24 
16 IP.61 1:03.24 
20 22.14 1:37.68 
30 30.03 3:26.57 
40 37.56 5:48.43 
Table 5.5 
Results of experiment number 1. 
Additional tests indicate that if P and 0 are chosen to 
produce an n which has a length twice the block size the 
execution time of RSA is about two thirds of the values 
given in table 5.5, but recall the caveat concernina this 
given earlier. 
For experiment 2 the values of e chosen are aiven in 
table 5.6. They were chosen so as to Provide an upper 
bound on the CPU time for decimal values of e and d which 
have the same number of digits in their binary 
representations, i.e., the e values chosen  convert  to  a 
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strinq of ones ■'in binary. For example, any e which has a 
binary representation 7 digits lonq or less will require 
less CPU time than 127 (binary=l111111).An e equal to 129 
(binary=10000001) while larger than 127, and longer in 
binary will take less CPU time to encrypt a messaqe 
because of the sparsity of ones in its binary 
representation. These e values were used with the P, Q, 
and n for a block size of 20 given in table 5.4. 
VALUE OF e 
23 -i 
29 - 
215- 
219- 
221- 
2^- 
231- 
245- 
CPU TIME 
ENCRYPTION     DECRYPTION 
2.80 
4.24 
5.72 
6.61 
7.17 
8.59 
9.49 
12.98 
26.60 
27.28 
26.64 
26.30 
26.93 
26.59 
25.61 
26.18 
Table 5.6 
Results  of experiment number 2. 
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Note the interesting result that each e used produced a  d 
which  used  about the same amount of time for decryDtion. 
40 All the d values were on the order of  10  .   The  reason 
for this is unknown. One would expect the d to decrease 
once e qrows to near the square root of @(n). These 
results indicate that the execution time of RSA increases 
linearly, but discontinuously as the value of e or d 
increases for a given P, Q, and n. Figure 5.2 is a plot 
of the data in table 5.6 for encryption time. Figure 5.3 
illustrates the general effect of the size of e or d on 
execution time. 
In conclusion one should use an n the same number of 
digits as twice the block size unless text characters are 
assigned all the numbers from 1 to 99, in which case n 
will have to be a least one digit lonaer. The d should 
come from a large enough set to avoid discovery by trial 
and error, and both e and d should have mostly zeroes in 
their binary representations for rapid execution. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EVALUATION OF A CRYPTANALYTIC ATTACK 
6.1 HERLESTAM'S METHOD 
Tore Herlestam of Sweden's Department of sianal 
Security proposed [24] a method which would permit one to 
recover a plaintext from a ciohertext produced using the 
RSA public-key cryptosystem without knowledge of the 
decryption exponent d or the prime factors of n, i.e., P 
and 0 . Herlestam's method consists of findino two 
polynomials in e, the public encryption exponent, namely 
Z(e), and X(e) such that: 
M 
Z(e)=e*X(e) (6.1) 
To  crack  the  cryptosystem  one  would  try  to  find  a 
polynomial  Z(e)  so  that  for  a  oiven ciphertext C the 
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following equation holds. 
C=CZ(e}mod n) (6.2) 
If successful then the plaintext M mav be recovered from 
M=CX(e}mod n). (6.3) 
If the RSA encryption function is soecified by F  and 
e 
the  corresponding  decryption  function  F, as F~   It is 
a     e 
easy to construct F_. .when Z(e)  is  a  Dolynomial  since 
Z(e) 
F /. // (M)=F ,(M)F,.(M) (mod n),  in particular F ^F .  If a C 
e+e'     e'    e' e  e 
happens to satisfy equation 6.3 it  is  a  fixed-point  of 
F   .  The  usefulness   of the method depends  heavily on 
Z(e) 
the number  of  fixed-points  for  F   .   The  number  of 
Z(e) 
fixed-points I   (n) for F    is 
Z(e)        Z(e) 
T   (n) = I   (P)I   (0) 
Z(e)      Z(e)   Z(e) 
(6.4) 
where 
T   (P) = l+qcd(Z(e)-t,o-l) 
Z(e) 
(6.5) 
In order for the fixed-points to constitute a significant 
portion of all n possible texts, Z(e)-t should have large 
common divisors with both P-l and 0-1. 
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For the simple case when Z(e)=er the number of fixed 
points will be at the maximum when P-1=2*P', P' a prime 
and Q-1=2*Q', 0' a prime and both P' and 0' divide Z(e)-1, 
i.e., er=l (mod P') and er=l (mod 0'). If, in addition, 
P'=2*P" + 1, P" a prime and similarly for 0', (P" and Q" 
divide r) the number of fixed ooints will only be 
significant for prohibitively large r when Z(e) is chosen 
to be er. Herlestam discounts a proposal by Rivest C25] 
to avoid common factors in er-l and P-l, claiming that it 
would only work for "unrealisticly small" r. Consider 
though that r need not be too large before er really blows 
up into a very very large number. Herlestam nonetheless 
considers performing the calculation of eguation 6.2 for 
an r=106 as not impractical. In anv case Herlestam points 
out that factors in er-l of the form ew-l, where w divides 
r are not considered explicitly. 
Herlestam recommends that even when P is chosen such 
that P=2*P'+1, P' a prime, P'=2*P" + l, P" a prime (and, 
similarly, for 0) then the cryotosystem can be cracked 
using  a  Z(e)  of  the form ea+e  where a = l,2,....,m, and 
b=l,2, k, m and k being small.  This method is claimed 
to  be  able  to recover about 25% of all Plaintexts.  The 
odds can be roughly doubled by complementing.  Since e  is 
e 
odd,  (n-M) =n-C (mod n)  Therefore,  eouation  6.2 may be 
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rewritten as 
n-C5(n-C)Z(e)(mod n) 
so that 
(6.6) 
M=n-(n-C?*e* (mod n). (6.7) 
6.2 PROGRAM DECRYP 
In order to test Herlestam's attack the FORTRAN 
proqram DECRYP was written to take a test plaintext file, 
encrypt  it,  and  then  for  each  record  of  clphertext 
calculate  C ^etmod n),  where  Z(e)= ea +e .   If for some 
Z (el 
small value of a and b C v tmod n)=C then  the  clphertext 
record in question could be deciphered by calculatinq the 
result of Cx^e^mod n), where X(e)= eaHeb~* Herlestam's 
method would be considered successful if DECRYP succeeded 
in findlnq polynomials Z(e) usinq small a and b so that 
equation 6.2 holds for at lest 25% of the records of the 
enciphered test file. When DF.CRYP finds a Z(e) 
satisfyinq equation 6.2 it proceeds to the next record 
even if a or b have not reached their permitted maximum. 
This is done to avoid wastinq time lookinq for additional 
solutions. DECRYP accepts a user named plaintext file, 
encrypts  it  based on the number of characters oer record 
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specified by the user, and then proceeds to try to find a 
Z(e) satisfying equation 6.2. If successful DECFYP 
prints the value of a and b. 
Since ea+e  equals e +ea, DECRYP  varies a and b such 
that   as   a = l,2,3, .m,  b = l, a.   This  prevents 
unnecessary, and expensive repitition of calculations. A 
tremendous amount of time is also saved by noting that: 
a. b a  b 
(f +e (mod n)E(f *f    (mod n)H(Ce (mod n))*(Ce (mod n))(mod n) 
This   indicates   that   one   need   only  perform   an 
exponentiation  and  reduction  modulo  n  each  time a is 
a 
incremented if the previous (lesser values) of  Ce (mod n) 
have  been  saved.   For example, when a is increased to 4 
say, it is then  necessary  to  calculate  6.2  for  Z(e)= 
e*+e\  e*+e3,  e*+e2,  and  e +e , but this can easily be 
done by multiplying the result of C  (mod n) by itself and 
ea the previously stored values of C (mod n) when a=l,2, and 
3. DECRYP stores these previously calculated values in a 
random access file one value per record. The time 
associated with reading a record and performing the 
multiplication is significantly less than repeating the 
exponentiation  and  reduction  modulo  n.    Nevertheless 
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DECRYP still requires a lot of CPU time to execute. The 
values of a and b were limited to < 36, and the test 
plaintext file was limited to 240 characters. This file 
which appears in Table 6.1 was reblockred to form three 
files: one of 120 records with 2 characters per record, 
one of 60 records with 4 characters Der record, and one of 
40 records with 6 characters Der record. It was desiqned 
so that in each of these forms there were no duplicate 
records to avoid repeating the same series of 
calculations. Beyond 6 characters per record the CPU time 
became excessive considerinq the experiments were beinq 
run in a time sharinq environment. 
RECORD PLAINTEXT 
1 GARCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZtN]"_»abcdefq 
2 hljlclmnopqrstuvwxyz< I >~   !"#$%&* ()*+,-./0 
3 12 3456789: ?< = >??> = <; :987 654 321 <>/.-,+*)(• 
4 &%$#"!   "*> MzyxwvutsrqponmlklJ.hqfedcba*-.". 
5 ]\[ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBApZAYnXCWDVE 
6 UFTGSHRIQJPKOLNMAaBbCcDdEeFfGqHhliJjKkLl 
record start record stop 
Table 6.1 
Plaintext file used with program DECRYP 
The results of the experiments using Herlestam's 
attack are given in table 6.2. These indicate that the 
method is not useful for breakinq  the  RSA  cryptosystem. 
92 
In onlv one case, i.e., n=59953 with e=53 was the attack 
successful in achieving near a 25% rate of cracking. For 
all other runs less than 2% of the Plaintext records could 
be recovered. 
These results should be considered in  the  liaht  of 
the  CPU  time  required, which, on average was 15 minutes 
for the  2  char./record  tests,  75  minutes  for  the  4 
char./record  tests,  and  2  hours for the 6 char./record 
tests.  Note that the time is hiahlv dependent on the size 
of  e,  the  number  of  records tested, and of course the 
maximum value of a and b.  In that much CPU time  n  could 
easily  have been factored.  In fact in a rebuttal, Rivest 
[25] claims that Herlestam's attack mav  be  viewed  as  a 
highly  inefficient method for factoring n.  If this is so 
then succesfully decrypting one ciphertext would allow one 
to  factor  n  and  thereby  decrypt all ciphertexts after 
determining d.  Rivest concludes  that  for  large  n  the 
probability  of  finding  a Z(e) that works is of the same 
order as attempting to break the code bv exhaustive search 
for  d.   Herlestam  concluded  that  the  probability  of 
order CC)=P'Q', where P'O' divides A'P'B'0' (A',B',  small 
n 
primes, and P',0' large primes), is inversely proportional 
to the number of divisors of A'P'B'0'=(P-1)(0-1). Rivest 
argues  that the fraction of divisors of (P-D(O-l) is not 
93 
3/4, but should be calculated  from  (P'+Q'-l)/P'Q'  which 
for  large  n  will be on the order of 10~ .  For equation 
6.2 to hold Z(e) must be  divisible  bv  order (C).   This 
n 
requires that P'Q' divide Z(e), and Rivest states the 
probability of this is on the order of (P'Q')"1. For an 
n =10 p' and 0' would probably be on the order of 1038so 
that it' is obvious that for an n chosen to withstand 
attempts at factoring this attack does not present a 
threat. 
For: P=73, 0=151, n=11023, a,b<26, 2char./rec. 120 records 
e       No. Rec. DeciDherable 
29 none 
4469 none 
41 none 
3161 none 
fit none 
3541 none 
97 1 
5233 1 
Values of (a,b) 
( 2,1) 
(1,1) 
For: P=167, 0=359, n=59953, a,b<26, 2char./rec. 120 rec. 
e       No. Rec. DeciDherable 
4 3 2 
29023 2 
53 28 
7849 2 
61 2 
12665 2 
73 2 
9769 2 
89 2 
17361 2 
Values of (a,b) 
(20.8) (11,5) 
(12,10) (7,3) 
(25,25) each rec. 
(19,4) (8,1) 
(16,14) (12,3) 
(9,5) (R,6) 
(13.9) (18,15) 
(7,2) (6,1) 
(25,4) (11,10) 
(10,7) (4,1) 
NOTE: For each of the e used the same two records were 
found to be decipherable. 
Table 6.2 
Results of experiments usino Droaram DECRYP. 
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For: n=547009091, a,b<31 4 char./rec. 60 records 
e       No. Rec. Decipherable    Values of (a,b) 
178956847 none 
82622431 none 
For: n=5386573295209, a,b<36, 6 char./rec. 40 records 
e       No. Rec. Decipherable    Values of (a,b) 
178956847 none 
1935462763183        none 
Table 6.2 cont. 
Results of experiments usinq Drocrram DECRYP. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
There is a tremendous future for the marriage of 
cryDtology and computers. For the present conventional 
cryptology, in the form of the DES, provides adeauate 
security for stored and transmitted data/information. In 
the /future the DES must be replaced or strengthened. In 
the meantime the problem of key distribution should be 
analysed more rigorously. Game theorv should be examined 
as a tool for evaluating different key distribution 
protocols. 
The RSA public-key cryptosvstem has been found to be 
secure against the cryptanalytic attack proposed by T. 
Herlestam. unfortunately the : hioh level (FORTRAN) 
implementation of the system is too slow for use in a high 
volume  electronic  mail  system.   The   key  aeneration 
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programs are useful however. The RSA crvptosystem could 
be used to make an insecure channel secure for the rapid 
and inexpensive transmission of a conventional 
cryptosystem's keys, e.g., the DES. Herlestam [241 also 
suggests a method of breaking the trapdoor knapsack 
public-key cryptosystem.  This should be investigated. 
Research needs to be done on imDlementinq the RSA 
cryptosystem on specially designed hardware, still it is 
unlikely that encryption rates approaching the several 
million bits per second rates of the DES will ever be 
achieved. 
While the RSA cryptosystem may never be useful for 
encrypting entire messages in a high volume electronic 
mail system, it may still be of value for implementing 
signatures. The problem of producing a short signature 
which uniquely identifies a plaintext message is an area 
for further research. 
If a short (say 80-digit) signature could be guickly 
derived from a plaintext message that would uniquelv (or 
at least, with high probability) identify the plaintext, 
then the RSA cryptosystem could be used in association 
with the DES to provide security, privacy, and 
authentication  capability.  The encrvDtion of an BO-digit 
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signature by the RSA cryptosystem would only require about 
a second. Decryption would only be necessary if a dispute 
should arise. 
For example, a possible method of creatina a 
signature might be as follows. A sender would inform the 
mail system that he/she wished to siqn a messaae. Suppose 
the message were: 
GARY FISHER SIGNED THIS 
The system would create an 80-diqit signature (in general 
the message will be much longer than the signature) that 
uniquely identifies the above plaintext. For example, the 
system miqht put the date, time, sender's social security 
number, and receiver's social security number into the 
signature. This would require 6+6+9+9=30 digits. The 
remaining 50 digits would be a number derived from the 
plaintext. It is suggested that to do this the system 
convert the message to a number by some substitution known 
only to the system's operators (e.g., the government). 
The date, time, etc. could then be used as a seed to a 
secret (known only to the government) random number 
generator. The series of numbers generated would then be 
used to produce a (near) unigue number from the numerical 
form of the plaintext. SupDose we convert the Plaintext 
to a number by substituting 1 for A, 2 for B,....26 for Z. 
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Then assume the random number series produced were 
3,8,4,1,5,4,6,.... Then one possible method of generating 
the signature number Is illustrated in figure 7.1. 
GARY      FISHER      SIGNED      THIS 
as  a  series  of  numbers   is: 
7,1,18,25,6,9,19,8,5,18,19,9,7,14,5,4,20,8,9/19 
using the random numbers the signature algorithm produces 
(7 + l)xl8 + (25 + 6 + 9-«-i9 + 8 + 5 + l8)xl9 + (9+7+l4)x5 + 
(20+8+9+19) 
(8x18) + (90x19) + (30x5) + (56) 
146 + 1710 + 150 + 56 = 2062 
Figure 7.1 
Creating a signature number. 
This algorithm works this way: 
1.  Given a series of random numbers r.r„r„ 12 3 
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2.  Set k=l 
3.  For the next r, -1 plaintext numbers form the sum  then 
multiply  it  by  the  rith plaintext number to form a 
product.  If r. =1, consider the Plaintext number to be k 
multiplied by unity. If the r. is larqer than the 
number of plaintext characters just sum the last few 
plaintext numbers and consider them multiplied by 
unity. 
4. If all plaintext numbers nave been used go to step  5, 
otherwise k=k+l and go to step 3. 
5. Sum all the products formed in step 3  the result  is 
the signature number.  STOP. 
The signature number is appended to the other information 
in  the  signature;   any remaining spaces are padded with 
zeroes.   The  signature  is  then  encrvpted using   the 
sender's  secret  RSA  decryption  kev.   Both a clear and 
enciphered form of the signature is then sent along with 
the associated plaintext; all being encrypted using the 
DES if security and privacy are also desired. 
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With the above method, should a dispute arise, a 
court could reproduce the random number stream from the 
seed in the clear form of the signature, convert the 
plaintext in question to a number usino the government's 
secret substitution method and oo through the process of 
generating the signature number. If the Plaintext is 
different from the one the signature was developed for, 
then the number generated by the court will not be the 
same as the one in the signature (most likely). Note that 
the receiver could not forge a signature without knowing 
the senders secret decryption exponent d. 
With a system like the one outlined above it would be 
very difficult to produce a forged oiaintext (especially 
with the desired content) which matched the signature of 
the legitimate plaintext even if one knew the government's 
substitution scheme and/or the method of generating random 
numbers. Both the substitution scheme and the random 
number generator could change often, the date in the 
signature revealing which system was used. The above 
system also allows signature numbers for very lono 
plaintexts to be developed before the 50-digit limit is 
exceeded. In fact there is room for additional 
information in the signature. One useful item might be 
the total number of characters in the Plaintext. 
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Until a fast public-key cryptosvstem is developed, 
the implementation of authentication capability using such 
systems while relying on conventional cryptography to 
provide security and privacy is an area that should be 
studied. The development of public-kev cryptosystems is 
still in its infancy. NP-comDlete problems offer many 
opportunities to develop such systems. 
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APPENDIX I 
FLOWCHARTS OF MULTIPRECISION ALGORITHMS 
NOTES ON THE ALGORITHMS 
1. All' algorithms are for operations on two Dositive 
Integer operands which are stored in the one 
dimensional (FORTRAN) arrays NONE and NTWO. 
2. In the flowcharts all variables and arrays that begin 
with an I, J, K, L, M, or N should be considered to 
function in all mathematical expressions as integer 
variables and arrays function in FORTRAN expressions. 
All others act as FORTRAN real variables or arrays. 
3. The result of each algorithm is a positive integer 
stored in the one dimensional FORTRAN array NRES. In 
the modulo and division algorithms MRES holds the 
remainder? the guotient in the division algorithm is 
stored in the array. NQUO. 
4. The number of array elements used are designated by 
the integer variables LI, L2, LP, and LO for NONE, 
NTWO, MRES, and NQUO respectively. Low order digits 
are stored in the first array element and consecutive 
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digits in consecutive elements, storing four digits 
oer element. For example, if NCWE=1 ,234,567, B90 then 
NONE(1)=7890 N0NE(2)=3456 NONE(3)=O0t2 and Ll=3. 
Unused array elements are assumed eoual to zero at the 
start of the algorithm. 
5.  For the addition, subtraction, modulo* and division 
algorithms NONE^NTWO in the flowcharts. 
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START 
ACCEPT: NONE, Ll 
NTWO, L2 
ADDITION 
I-O, J-0.LR-L1 
IREM-O, K-Ll+1 
NRES(i)-0 i-1.. 
-*1   I-I+l 
NRES(I)-NONE(I)+NTWO(I) 
JL 
STOP 
NRES-NONE+NTWO 
N 
IREM-NRES(I)/10000 
NRES(I)-NRES(I)-(10000*IREM) 
J-I+l 
NRES(J)-NRES(J)+IREM 
LR-K 
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/*"   START 
I ACCEPT: NONE, LI 
\^    NTWO, L2 
SUBTRACTION 
1-0, J-O, LR-L1 
NRES(i)-0 i-1,2,. .LI 
I-I+l 
N 
NONE(I)-NONE(I)+l0000 
J-I+l 
NONE m -NONE f.T^-1 
NRES(I)-NONE(I)-NTWO(I) 
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/ AC( 
START 
CEPT: NONE, LI 
V NTWO, L2 
MULTIPLICATION 
\ ' 
1-0, J-0, LR-L1+L2 
K-O, N-LR-1, IREM-0 
NRES(i)-0 i-1,2 LR 
" 
I-I+l ^ 
" 
J-J+l 
' ' 
K-I+J-l 
' ' 
NRES(K)-NRES(K)+(NONE(I)*NTWO(J)) 
i Y . N 
J-0 H 
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M 
MULTIPLICATION cont. 
I-I+l    * 
K-I+l 
IREM-NRES(I)/10000 
NRES(I)-NRES(I)-(10000*IREM) 
NRES(K)-NRES(K)+IREM 
N 
< 
LR-N 
N 
STOP 
NRES-NONE*NTWO 
1.08 
( START 
(ACCEPT: NONE, Ll 
NTWO, L2 
MODULO 
1-0, J-O, K-0 
NRES(i)-0 1-1,2,...Ll 
LD-L1-L2 
G> 
INUM-NONE(L1)*10000+NONE(L1-1) 
IDEN-NTWO(L2)+l 
IMUL-INUM/IDEN 
IMUL-NONE(L1)/NTWO(L2)H) LD-LD-1 F 
^0 
1-0 
I-I+I 
J-LD+l 
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MODULO cont. 
NTEST-NTWO (I) *IMUL 
- MUL-NTEST/10000 
NONE(J)-NONE(J)+MUL*10000 
K-J+l 
NONE(K)-NONE(K)-MUL 
MUL-MUL+1 
NONE(J)-NONE(J)-NTEST 
NONE(J)-NONE(J)+1000< 
IM r 
Ll-Ll-1 
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MODULO   cont, 
K-T.,? 
IDIF-NONE(K)-NTWO(K) 
If   K-l 
JLX K-K-l 
IMUL-N0NE(L1)/(NTW0(L2)+1) 
IMUL-1 
;I-I+1 
NTEST-NTWQ(I)*IMUL 
.MUL-NTEST/IOOOQ 
NONE(I)-NONE(I)+MUL*100Q0 
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4Ma. 
MUL-MUL+1 
N0NE(I)-NQNEfI)+100QQ f 
L4Mc 
MODULO   cont. 
>   J-I+l 
NONE(J)-NONE(J)-MUL 
NONEm-NONE(I)-MTRST 
3MI Y 
Ll-Ll-1 
set   NRES-NONE   and 
LR-L1;   original   NONE 
contents .destroyed , 
STOP 
NRES-remalnder of 
NONE/NTWO 
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DIVISION 
Multiprecision add of 
IQUO to NQUO 
TQWOCKQ-Q 
* 
For division define two additional arrays NQUO and IQUO 
and their length variables LQ and IQ, and insert the above 
logic in the modulo algorithm where shown.  At the end of 
the algorithm NQUO will contain the quotient from the 
division of NONE by NTWO. 
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APPENDIX II 
SAMPLE PROGRAM EXECUTIONS 
NOTES 
Underlined text is what was tyoed bv the user. Text 
in Darentheses is explanatory information, and does not 
appear on the user's terminal. A user typed carriage 
return is signified by CCRJ . All procrrams were previously 
comDiled. 
PRIME 
PEXECUTE PRIMECCR] 
LINK:   Loading 
CLNKXCT PRIME Execution] 
THIS PROGRAM FINDS PRIME NUMBERS 
STARTING AT AM INITIAL GUESS 
HOW MANY DIGITS LONG WILL THE PRIME BE? 
5[CR3 
TYPE AN ODD NUMBER NOT ENDING IN A 5  5 DIGITS LONG 
54549[CR] 
4549 
4551   (last 4 digits of each number tried) 
4553 
4557 
THIS NUMBER IS PRIME 
54559 
TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH TYPE C 
[CR]    (a C typed will cause PRIME to continue executing) 
STOP 
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NEXTPR 
^EXECUTE NEXTPRCCR] 
LINK:   Loadina 
[LNKXCT NEXTPR Execution] 
THIS PROGRAM PRODUCES A PRIME NUMBER P SUCH THAT 
P-l HAS A PRIME FACTOR EQUAL TO A PRIME YOU SUPPLY 
YOU MUST SUPPLY AN INITIAL PPIME NUMBER 
HOW MANY DIGITS LONG IS IT? 
5[CR] 
TYPE A'PRIME NUMBER   5 DIGITS LONG 
54559CCR] 
THIS NUMBER IS THE PRIME P 
982063 
STOP 
EFIND 
SEXECUTE EFINDtCR] 
LINK:   Loading 
[LNKXCT EFIND Execution] 
THIS PROGRAM FINDS A e WHICH IS RELATIVELY PRIME 
TO THE TOTIENT FUNCTION OF TWO PRIMES P AND Q 
YOU MUST SUPPLY P, Q AND AN INITIAL GUESS FOR e 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF P 
6[CR] 
TYPE P 
982063CCR] 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF 0 
3CCR] 
TYPE 0 
557CCR] 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF YOUR GUESS NUMBER FOR e 
9CCR] 
TYPE AN ODD NUMBER e 
178956847ECR] 
THIS IS THE VALUE OF e 
178956847   (a lucky guess) 
STOP 
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KEY 
EXECUTE KEYCCR1 
LINK: Loading 
[LNKXCT KEY Execution] 
GIVEN TWO PRIME NUMBFRS P AND 0 AND A THIRD NUMBER 
e RELATIVELY PRIME TO THE TOTIENT FUNCTION OF P 
AND Q THIS PROGRAM COMPUTES A d AND n AND CREATES 
ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION KEYFILES FOR PROGRAM RSA 
TYPE THE NAME OF THE FILE TO CONTAIN THE DECRYPTION KEY 
DKEY.DATtCR)  (any acceptable DECsystem-20 file name) 
TYPE THE NAME OF THE FILE TO CONTAIN THE ENCRYPTION KEY 
EKEY.DATCCR]  (any acceptable DECsystem-20 file name) 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF P 
6CCR] 
TYPE P 
982063CCR] 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF 0 
3CCR1 
TYPE 0 
557CCR) 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF e 
9CCR] 
TYPE e 
178956R47CCR] 
546026472  (value of the totlent function) 
STOP  (If the d found Is unacceptable there is an) 
(error message, try another e) 
PTYPE EKEY.DATCCR)  (to see the contents) 
3     178956847    (value of e) 
3     547009091    (value of n) 
PTYPE DKEY.DAT(CR) 
2 82622431        (value of d) 
3 547009091    (value of n) 
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KEY 
EXECUTE KEYCCR] 
LINK: Loadinq 
[LNKXCT KEY Execution] 
GIVEN TWO PRIME NUMBERS P AND Q AND A THIRD NUMBER 
e RELATIVELY PRLME^ TO THE TOTIENT FUNCTION OF P 
AND Q THIS PROGRAM COMPUTES A d AND n AND CREATES 
ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION KEYFILES FOR PROGRAM RSA 
TYPE THE NAME OF THE FILE TO CONTAIN THE DECRYPTION KEY 
DKKY.DATCCP]  (any acceptable DECsystem-20 file name) 
TYPE THE NAME OF THE FILE TO CONTAIN THE ENCRYPTION KEY 
EKEY.DATCCR]  (any acceptable DECsystem-20 file name) 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF P 
6(CRJ 
TYPE P 
982063CCR] 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF 0 
3[CR] 
TYPE 0 
557CCR] 
TYPE THE LENGTH OF e 
9CCR] 
TYPE e 
178956R47CCR] 
546026472  (value of the totient function) 
STOP  (if the d found is unacceptable there is an) 
(error message, try another e) 
PTYPE EKEY.DATCCR)  (to see the contents) 
3     178956847    (value of e) 
3    547009091    (value of n) 
PTYPE DKEY.DATCCR] 
2 82622431       (value of d) 
3 547009091    (value of n) 
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RSA (ENCRYPTION) 
^EXECUTE RSA[CR] 
LINK:   Loadino 
[LNKXCT RSA Execution] 
FOR ENCRYPTION TYPE E FOR DECRYPTION TYPE D 
E(CR) 
TYPE SPECIFICATION OF FILE CONTAINING THE REOUIRED KEY 
EKEY.DATCCR]  (any acceptable DECsystem-20 file name) 
TYPE SPECIFICATION OF FILE CONTAINING THE PLAINTEXT 
M.DATCCR]     (any acceptable DECsystem-20 file name) 
CHARACTERS/RECORD OF FILE TO BE ENCRYPTED 
NOTE: MUST BE AN EVEN INTEGER <  5     (based on n) 
4CCR] 
TYPE SPECIFICATION OF FILE TO CONTAIN THE ENCRYPTED TEXT 
C.DATCCR]     (any acceptable DECsvstem-20 file name) 
STOP 
RSA (DECRYPTION) 
^EXECUTE PSA[CR] 
LINK    Loadinq 
tLNKXCT RSA Execution] 
FOR ENCRYPTION TYPE E FOR DECRYPTION TYPE D 
D[CR] 
TYPE SPECIFICATION OF FILE CONTAINING THE REOUIRED KEY 
DKEY.DAT(CR) 
TYPE SPECIFICATION OF FILE CONTAINING THE ENCRYPTED TEXT 
C.DATCCR] 
TYPE SPECIFICATION OF FILE TO RECEIVE DECRYPTED MESSAGE 
MDEC.DATfCR] 
STOP 
(MDEC.DAT now equals M.DAT) 
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